Alan Whitehead: I beg to move amendment 7, in clause4,page5,line6,at end add—
‘(5) Regulations under subsection (2) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”
This amendment would prevent the commencement of clauses 1 and 2 without the regulations made under this section being subject to the affirmative procedure.
This is a simple amendment that repeats the requirement suggested in other amendments for secondary legislation to be subject to the affirmative, rather than negative, procedure. I made the case this morning for the power of the affirmative procedure. As hon. Members can see, the amendment would ensure that regulations under subsection (2) could not be made unless a draft instrument were laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House—that means an affirmative resolution.
I do not think we need go over the difference between an affirmative and a negative resolution and why we think affirmative resolutions are always better. Through the amendment, we simply seek to ensure that regulations made under subsection (2) are subject to the affirmative procedure. I do not think we need to detain the Committee too much further with detailed discussion. We think this is important and consider that it should be included in the Bill, to ensure that matters properly come before the House when these issues are discussed.

The purpose of this Act is to provide for a contingent arrangement for nuclear safeguarding arrangements under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the event that the United Kingdom no longer has membership or associate membership of EURATOM, to ensure that qualifying nuclear material, facilities or equipment are only available for use for civil activities (whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere).” —
This new clause would be a purpose clause, to establish that the provisions of the Bill are contingency arrangements if it proves impossible to establish an association with EURATOM after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

Richard Harrington: I do remember the evidence and Dr Golshan spoke also to Select Committees that I have appeared before, but she did make it clear that while she could not guarantee that we could exactly replicate, we could have a safeguards regime that was very serviceable in working very quickly towards what Euratom is. I do respect her and the institution she works for, but there is no precedent for this.
I accept the gist of what the hon. Gentleman is saying, but the same argument might be as true at the end of the transition period as it would be at the beginning of it. However, I am certain and satisfied that we can do the necessary recruitment and make the necessary agreements—which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston mentioned in her contribution—but actually within the time period required. I am sure that if we are not able to do that, I will be hauled before the Select Committee, the Chamber and everything else, and quite rightly. It is the job of Government to make decisions and it is our full intention and belief that we will be able to achieve that. I accept the fact that there is no precedent; I accept that people are entitled to their expert opinions. I do not at all deny that she said it, because I was here and it is on the record, and anyway I respect her too much to say that she is not correct in her view. I suppose I can say that, not being an expert, but my colleagues at the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy spend a lot of time with all her colleagues, and it is our job to ensure that it does happen.
If I may return to the transition period, everyone really wants the same thing, as I have said. However, the agreement of some form of transitional period is not within the gift of my Department. It is subject to the wider EU negotiations, as I am sure hon. Members will agree. The Prime Minister spoke in her Florence speech about a period of implementation after the UK has ceased to be a member of the EU. That is well understood within the EU, and would be mirrored for Euratom. We would not continue to be a member state of the EU at that time. We would be expected to continue to pay into it and be bound by many of its rules for the transition period, in exchange for which we would expect to continue to enjoy some of the benefits and give ourselves extra time to get domestic arrangements in place, but it is not a way of delaying our departure from Euratom; I felt I should make that clear.
The Prime Minister also made it clear in her Florence speech that we would leave the EU on 29 March 2019. To that end, as hon. Members may be aware, the Government have tabled an amendment to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill that would make it clear on the face of that Bill that “exit day” constitutes 11 pm on 29 March 2019. The amendment, as I understand it, is not seeking a transition period after exit day, but calling for a transitional period before exit day in order to delay our departure from Euratom. That is not a situation envisaged in the proposals for the implementation period. Proposed new clause 2 sets out a position entirely inconsistent with that, which is why I have to oppose it. The purpose of the implementation period is to secure more time in which to put in place our new arrangements. The Government’s clear intention is that that should include Euratom where appropriate, as well as the broader EU negotiations.
The new clause would arguably introduce even greater complexity and uncertainty into an already complicated negotiation, both within the EU and with other parties. The proposal captured by the new clause is that we should leave Euratom at a different time from leaving the EU. However, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, who the hon. Member for Southampton, Test often quotes, said, the two are uniquely joined; so I would argue that there would be significant ambiguities for businesses during the transition period if for two years—assuming it were even possible—we were members of one institution but not the other.
It would clearly be better to have exactly the same approach for both the EU and Euratom, in which we leave at the time the Prime Minister said we would and negotiate toward a two-year implementation alongside our future relationship on both Euratom and the wider EU. That would keep everything aligned and much clearer, which is particularly helpful where there are areas of overlap between Euratom and the wider negotiations, such as on access to skilled workers and movement of goods. For the reasons I have set out, I hope satisfactorily, I am not able to accept the amendment. I hope the hon. Members will consider what I have said and that the new clause will be withdrawn.

Alan Whitehead: I am not sure that, for the sake of the apparent administrative convenience of leaving the two institutions on the same day, everything will be better served. We have discussed in this Committee precisely  why things probably would not be better served regarding the process of ensuring that we have everything in place to replace what we acknowledge that we have received well from Euratom in the past. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston, in a brief but important contribution, raised the question of how likely it is that the various bilateral deals that we will have to make with various states around the world will be concluded in a timely fashion. Indeed, I suggest that the opposite is the case—they are not likely to be concluded in a timely fashion, not least because, for example, agreements with the United States would have to go through both Houses of Congress.
It is unlikely that there will be anything other than a rather messy tail hanging around for quite a long while if we stated that we were leaving Euratom on the same exit day the Prime Minister is suggesting in amendment 381 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. I do not know whether this piece of advice will be welcome, but if that is what the Prime Minister wishes to do, I think it might be a good idea for her to add the words “and Euratom” to that amendment. I say that because although Euratom and the EU are effectively conjoined, Euratom did not come into being at the same time as the European Union, and therefore it is not necessarily the case that if one puts in place an exit day for the EU, one automatically transfers that exit day to exit from Euratom. That may well be what the Government want to do, but it is by no means clear that that is what would actually have to happen.
It is possible to consider, without in any way undermining the idea that we leave Euratom, a different form of leaving day from that from the EU, in my opinion. That has not particularly been tested in terms of the arguments about whether the Euratom treaty was separate from the EU. The Minister may well be getting wise advice that that is not the case, but it seems at least arguable that there is nothing in stone, and nothing in the amendments tabled to the EU (Withdrawal) Bill, that points in the direction of having to leave Euratom at the same time as leaving the EU.
If it were possible to negotiate an arrangement whereby the aim was associate status of some description and the means were a transitional period, with the clear aim that that associate status would be in place at the end of it, that would seem to be a prudent thing to do, as far as our future relationship with Euratom is concerned, bearing in mind all the things we have said about how it has served us and what we could get from it during that transitional period, with that eventual aim in mind.
It would be not only desirable but very wise, in the present circumstances, to state on the face of the Bill that that is what we will try to do, and to require the Secretary of State to try to ensure that it happens. That does not undermine our future relationship with Euratom or with the EU; it merely puts in place something that is possible to achieve and that could be of considerable benefit to this country and to our partners in the nuclear community around the world.
It would enhance considerably the value of the Bill if that transitional arrangement did not succeed, because it would, among other things, show our partners in Euratom and the wider international community that we were intent and absolutely serious about wanting the  best possible regime for the future. That surely would be a considerable boost to the idea that we can survive well in an international and closely conjoined nuclear community while not being a member of Euratom in the long term. If the Minister is not prepared to accept the amendment, I would like it on the record that we tried to divide the Committee this afternoon.

Alan Whitehead: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time. The clause reflects what we have discussed in Committee about the process of securing an agreement that is voluntarily entered into with the IAEA to replace the previous agreement that was essentially mediated by Euratom, and hence has to be replaced.
One might think that the agreement should, in principle, be reasonably easy to arrive at. If we have a contingency nuclear safeguarding regime in place that we can demonstrate to IAEA fits the bill as a replacement for Euratom, the new voluntary agreement with IAEA should proceed reasonably straightforwardly. My understanding is that it is a voluntary agreement made by nuclear-possessing powers, and this is clearly about entering into an agreement as a nuclear-possessing power alongside other individual nuclear-possessing powers outside the ambit of Euratom. This would be something that we and the IAEA would want to conclude.
As we have heard, that agreement is still some way off being concluded. We are effectively in a position of preliminary discussions with the IAEA about what an agreement might look like, and how it should proceed. As we have heard, we are being asked to agree to put legislation on the statute book as if that agreement had been concluded. We are to take on trust the fact that the  agreement can be concluded in reasonably good time, so that the Henry VIII clauses we discussed this morning could be put in place. We discussed those clauses without knowing when or whether an agreement with the IAEA would be forthcoming, what stage of negotiation we were at, and whether there were particular obstacles in the road, or whether indeed those obstacles had been substantially resolved. It does not look as if we are going to hear anything about the agreement until its conclusion. However, we are part of a Parliament that is putting legislation in place as if we had heard about it.
The new clause essentially proposes that within three months of the passing of the Bill, and every three months thereafter, a report be laid before each House of Parliament detailing progress towards the conclusion of a relevant international agreement—the voluntary agreement with the IAEA, in this case—until that agreement has been concluded. It simply asks for, and would essentially certify in the Bill, light to be shed on the process, and for light to come back to Parliament on the process—as legislators, we have been have been required to pass legislation without knowledge of where that agreement stood, in what order it was and where we are going with it.
I have been told that those negotiations are apparently going well, that there is not a great deal of animosity towards the idea that a new agreement can be brought about and that the appreciation on both sides of the need for that agreement to happen reasonably swiftly is propelling the negotiations forward. However, I happen to know that because I have been told informally, which is not really good enough as far as the rest of Parliament is concerned. This is something that should be publicly stated and reported and can be publicly discussed, so that we are sure, between us, that that agreement has been undertaken and properly fits with what we are legislating on in Committee.
The new clause is modest in intent but would actually strengthen our hand, so that as Committee members we could say that while we legislated in some ignorance of what was going on, we nevertheless rectified that by requiring the report to be laid before Parliament, allowing everybody to see the picture as it develops and giving them a good idea of where things are going. When our grandchildren ask us what we did on the Bill, we will be able to say that we made sure the treaty was on its way, was properly announced and scrutinised and that, when it appeared, we could put our imprimatur on it with an easy heart and full understanding that it was actually part of the process and the satisfactory conclusion to leaving Euratom.

Richard Harrington: I hope I can help the hon. Gentleman in his quest to answer his grandchildren’s questions about what he did during Brexit and the great time when we were leaving Europe and so on. We all hope that for ourselves and our grandchildren. I completely understand the sentiments behind his new clause, which is reasoned and well argued. I intend to consider it carefully, and will come on to that in a moment.
For the record, new clause 4 seeks to require quarterly updates detailing the progress towards the conclusion of “relevant international agreements”, which is a defined term set out in the Bill. As he said, it means an agreement, whether ratified or not, to which the United Kingdom  is a party, which relates to nuclear safeguards and is specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State. I appreciate the objective of the new clause is for hon. Members, both on the Committee and generally within the House, to receive frequent updates on the status of international negotiations in this area. I will begin providing an immediate update on our international agreements relating to safeguards.
The hon. Gentleman said that he had been briefed informally, hopefully by me and others as part of general communications, but I would like to place it on record that the UK has begun formal negotiations with the IAEA on the future voluntary agreements for the application of civil nuclear safeguards in the UK, so that they are ready to be put in place by the time of our withdrawal from Euratom. We are seeking to conclude a new voluntary offer agreement and a new additional protocol on a bilateral basis with the agency. Our intention is that those agreements should follow exactly the same principles as the current ones. The discussions that began last September have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. I fully expect that the new agreements will be put to the IAEA board of governors for ratification in 2018. They will be subject to the usual ratification procedures, including parliamentary consideration.
As hon. Members will be aware, our aim is to maintain our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with the rest of the world, and we are working to ensure that arrangements are in place to allow that. Where action is required to ensure that civil nuclear trade and co-operation with non-European partners are not disrupted by our exit from Euratom, the Government are already entering into negotiations to ensure that nuclear co-operation agreements will be in place. Our team are in negotiations with key partners such as the USA, Canada, Australia and Japan. I met Ministers from those countries in Paris last week. The UK has a range of bilateral nuclear co-operation agreements in place with several countries, and we expect those to continue. The work highlights our commitment to ensuring that all arrangements are in place to allow our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation to continue.
Turn to the specific requirements imposed by new clause 4, as I said, although I appreciate the sentiments behind the clause, I cannot agree to the proposal. As I have just explained, “relevant international agreement” is a defined term referring to agreements already negotiated, and the specification of an agreement as a relevant international agreement is subject to a clear and open process. I fully appreciate the important role that parliamentary scrutiny plays. We have been and will continue to be open and honest with Parliament about ongoing negotiations.
Negotiations on international agreements relating to safeguards are progressing well, and the intention is to present those agreements to Parliament before ratification, before the UK’s withdrawal from Euratom, so that they will come into force immediately on our exit. Incidentally —as I know you will be aware, Mr Gray—international treaties are already subject to the ratification processes laid out in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.

Richard Harrington: Thank you, Mr Gray. I note that in accordance with provisions in the Bill, an international agreement may be defined as a relevant international agreement for the purpose of Bill only if the Secretary of State specifies that agreement in regulations. The Bill provides that such regulations will always be subject to the draft affirmative procedure, providing the opportunity for Parliamentary scrutiny of whether an agreement should be a relevant international agreements as defined by the Bill.
As I have established, relevant international agreements are already subject to an open and transparent process. My fear is that imposing an additional reporting requirement would provide little added value and might hinder negotiations, which I know the hon. Gentleman would not want. Indeed, requiring such frequent updates on negotiations could risk weakening our position and might compromise our ability to build rapport and trust with our negotiating partners. I am concerned that that should not happen, but I recognise fully the importance of transparency and the need for Parliament to be able to provide input into the negotiations, so I am sympathetic to the sentiment underpinning the new clause. If the hon. Gentleman is prepared not to press this to a vote—in fact, even if he does—I would like to give the matter some further thought, because I think I can come up with a proposal that strikes the right balance and maximises the transparency that he wants and that I am not afraid of at all. I do not want to impede the progress of these time-sensitive and vital negotiations, which of course involve other parties.

(1) The Secretary of State must consult the persons or bodies listed in subsection (2) before concluding—
(a) a relevant international agreement, or
(b) any agreement with EU Member States relating to nuclear safeguarding.
(2) The persons or bodies are—
(a) Scottish Ministers,
(b) Welsh Ministers, and
(c) a Northern Ireland devolved authority.—

Drew Hendry: I thank the Minister for his attempts at reassurance. I know that the Minister is genuinely trying to concede some ground and I appreciate that. However, his attempts at reassurance do not really hit the mark. There should be negotiations with the Scottish Government and the other devolved authorities in light of the devolved responsibilities. It just is not good enough that after the deal is done a consolation might be undertaken with Ministers. That is not the way that this should happen at all. There are significant impacts on the nuclear industry and those devolved responsibilities.

Richard Harrington: On a point of order, Mr Gray—it is the first point of order I have ever raised. I want to thank you as Chair, and Mr McCabe who is not here today. I would like to thank the Clerks. I would like to thank hon. Members on both sides of the Committee for their patience, time and valuable contributions. I look forward to seeing the Bill progress in terms of the discussions we shall have before Report and then on Report and beyond. I hope the Bill’s progress continues to be characterised by the spirit of co-operation and conciliation that we have enjoyed. I particularly thank the shadow Minister for that, but also everybody else who contributed.